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Abstract
Kleptoparasitism, the stealing of food by one animal from another, is a widespread biological
phenomenon. In this paper we build upon earlier models to investigate a population of con-
specifics involved in foraging and, potentially, kleptoparasitism. We assume that the population
is composed of four types of individuals, according to their strategic choices when faced with an
opportunity to steal and to resist an attack. The fitness of each type of individual depends upon
various natural parameters, for example food density, the handling time of a food item and the
probability of mounting a successful attack against resistance, as well as the choices that they
make. We find the Evolutionarily Stable Strategies (ESSs) for all parameter combinations and
show that there are six possible ESSs, four pure and two mixtures of two strategies, that can
occur. We show that there is always at least one ESS, and sometimes two or three. We further
investigate the influence of the different parameters on when each type of solution occurs.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we shall investigate a model of kleptoparasitism, the stealing by one
animal of food that has been caught by another (Rothschild and Clay 1952). The most
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common observations of kleptoparasitism have been amongst birds. An extensive review
(Brockmann and Barnard 1979) gives a list of observations of kleptoparasitism by birds.
It is noted there that this behavior is much more common in some orders of birds than
others, and it is especially prevalent amongst sea-birds. Observations include the sighting
of gulls attacking each other for food (Steele and Hockey 1995), oystercatchers feeding
on cockles (Triplet et al 1999) and skuas attacking albatrosses and giant-petrels (Spear
et al 1999). It should be noted that kleptoparasitism has been observed in many other
types of animals as well, including insects (Jeanne 1972), fish (Grimm and Klinge 1996)
and mammals (Kruuk 1972).
There is now a substantial literature of works using game theoretic models to investi-
gate kleptoparasitic behavior in nature (eg Barnard and Sibly 1981; Stillmann et al 1997;
Broom and Ruxton 1998; Ruxton and Broom 1999; Broom and Ruxton 2003). In one of
the most recent papers (Broom et al 2004), the generality of the original model of Broom
and Ruxton (1998) was expanded in two key ways: allowing flexibility in the likelihood
that an attacker will be able to successfully steal a prey item from a handler, and al-
lowing attacked individuals the flexibility to surrender items without a time-consuming
contest. This showed that (depending on the values given to ecological variables) three
different types of ESSs were possible: one where individuals both attacked others for
food items and resisted attacks from others (Hawk), one where individuals attacked but
did not resist (Marauder), and one where individuals did not attack, but would resist
if themselves attacked (Retaliator). Further, in some circumstances, more than one of
these ESS’s was possible as alternates, depending on the history of the system as well as
its current parameter values. The Marauder ESS is particularly interesting ecologically,
giving an economic explanation for one individual to surrender a valuable food item
without a fight to another individual in the absence of dominance hierarchies or intrinsic
asymmetries in competitive abilities between individuals.
2. The model, behavioral stages and strategies
The basic structure of our model follows that of Broom and Ruxton (1998). Individuals
forage for food, and can be in one of four behavioral stages. They are either a searcher
(looking for food), a handler (preparing to consume food it has found) an attacker (trying
to steal the food item from a handler it has found) or a resister (trying to resist the attack
of another). We assume that individuals take an exponential time to handle a food item,
and that the food is consumed in no time at the end of this period. Note that Broom and
Ruxton (2003) considered handling times which were constant and different food types,
where some types were consumed instantaneously at the end of the handling period as in
this paper, but others were consumed continuously. One consequence of this is that the
time spent handling a food item was of great importance, and this led to rather different
behavior to the other models. In particular not all kleptoparasitic choices were identical;
there was a threshold where opportunities were only taken if sufficiently little handling
had been done (continuous consumption) or if sufficiently long handling time had elapsed
(instantaneous consumption).
We consider a polymorphic population consisting of the four different bird types in-
troduced in Broom et al (2004), (see also Broom and Rychta´rˇ, 2007; Luther at al, 2007).
A bird’s type is determined by its strategy, i.e. by the reaction of an individual to an
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encounter with another, where one of the two birds is handling food, and the other has
an opportunity to try to steal it. The four strategies are:
Hawk always attack, always resist when attacked
Dove never attack, never resist when attacked
Retaliator never attack, always resist when attacked
Marauder always attack, never resist when attacked
Each bird is initially searching for food items. We assume that Doves and Retaliators find
food at rate νff (where f is the density of food) as opposed to Hawks and Marauders
who find food at rate νgf . When food is acquired the individual becomes a handler, the
handling time of the food item following an exponential distribution with mean th, after
which it is instantaneously consumed. Thus the food item can be thought of as an animal
that has to be removed from a shell, but that the time it takes to extract the animal
is unpredictable, and variable from item to item. Hawks and Marauders are searching
for handlers as well (at rate νh). Hawks and Marauders may thus have to divide their
attention between the two searches and it is possible that because of this that νg < νf .
We shall in any case consider νg and νf to be potentially different, and will also consider
the case where νg ≥ νf . When Marauder or Hawk find a handler, they attack and try to
steal its food. If they encounter Dove or Marauder, the handler surrenders the food item.
If they encounter Retaliator or Hawk, the handler resists the attack and thus both the
searcher and the handler engage in a fight. There are potentially many different types of
costs of the fight (injury, energy loss, time loss). In our model we assume that the only
cost is the time spent in the contest. The fights take a random time with exponential
distribution with mean ta2 . The attacker wins the fight with probability α ∈ (0, 1).
Let P be the total density of the population and Hd, Dd,Md, Rd be the densities of
Hawks, Doves, Marauders and Retaliators, respectively. Every individual goes through a
searching and handling period, Hawks and Marauders may be involved in fights as attack-
ers and Hawks and Retaliators may be involved in fights as resisters. Let Hs,Hh,Ha,Hr
denote the densities of Hawks in searching, handling, attacking and resisting stages. The
corresponding notation is used for other types, see Table 1.
We assume the total density of the population is constant and denote by Ps, Ph, Pa, Pr
the densities of the population involved in searching, handling, attacking and resisting.
Thus
P =Hd +Dd +Md +Rd (2.1)
Ps =Hs +Ds +Ms +Rs (2.2)
Ph =Hh +Dh +Mh +Rh (2.3)
Pa =Ha +Ma (2.4)
Pr =Hr +Rr (2.5)
We also assume that the fitness of an individual is proportional to its uptake rate, the
inverse of the total consumption time (i.e. finding the food item and eating it, including
all possible interruptions by others). The following equation can be found in Broom and
Rychta´rˇ (2007) and determines the total consumption time T for Hawks in terms of its
inverse handling ratio Hd/Hh (a similar equation holds for other strategies).
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Parameter meaning
P density of the population
Ps, Ph, Pa, Pr density of searchers, handlers, attackers and resisters
Dd, Rd, Hd,Md density of Doves, Retaliators, Hawks and Marauders
Ds, Rs, Hs,Ms density of searching Doves, Retaliators, Hawks and Marauders
Dh, Rh, Hh,Mh density of handling Doves, Retaliators, Hawks and Marauders
Ha,Ma density of attacking Hawks and Marauders
Rr, Hr density of resisting Retaliators and Hawks
hr handling ratio Hh/P in a population of Hawks only
f density of food items
νf area Doves and Retaliators can search for food per unit time
νg area Hawks and Marauders can search for food per unit time
νh area Hawks and Marauders can search for handlers per unit time
th expected time to consume a food item (if undisturbed)
ta
2
expected duration of a fight contest over food
α probability that the attacker wins the fight
Table 1
The model parameters and notation.
T = th · Hd
Hh
. (2.6)
The uptake rate is thus directly proportional to the proportion of time that each type
of individual spends in the handling stage (see Broom and Ruxton, 1998, amongst other
papers). This means that, the shorter the consumption time, the higher the fitness. We
shall consider each of the strategies in turn and evaluate its uptake rate in the mixed
population.
We shall investigate which mixtures are evolutionarily stable. A mixture is evolution-
arily stable if
a) all birds present in the mixture have equal fitness (i.e. their inverse handling ratio is
the same);
b) all birds not present in the mixture would have smaller fitness if they were only present
in very small numbers (with a density approaching 0); and
c) increasing the proportion of one strategy by a small amount lowers its fitness relative
to the other strategy, whereas decreasing the proportion increases its fitness relative
to the other strategy.
3. Equilibrium equations for the dynamical system
In this section we will consider each strategy and evaluate its inverse handling ratio,
from which its consumption time and hence uptake rate can be found. Transitions be-
tween the states follow the schematic description given in Figure 1, which then translates
into the differential equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12), (3.15),
(3.16), (3.17), (3.18) described and developed later in this section.
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Fig. 1. Phase diagrams for a) Doves, b) Retaliators, c) Marauders, d) Hawks.
We shall assume that the populations converge to equilibrium exponentially fast, and
we thus concentrate on these equilibrium values only. For the model of Broom and Ruxton
(1998), this fast convergence was shown in Luther and Broom (2004). The proof of Luther
and Broom (2004) also works for the special case of a single strategy population for each
of the four strategies of our model. We believe that this result holds more generally for our
situation with multiple strategies, and this has certainly proved the case in simulations.
The parameter values that we have chosen are plausible for real populations when the
time units are minutes; a sample set of simulated solutions in Figure 2 show convergence
within ten minutes from a population initially composed of searchers, as is reasonable at
the start of a foraging period (e.g. at the start of a new day).
3.1. Doves
Doves can go through searching and handling stages only. If a Dove is searching, it can
become a handler if it finds a food item (with the rate νff). If the Dove is a handler, it can
become a searcher if it finishes handling (with rate t−1h ) or is found by a searching Hawk
or Marauder (with the rate νh(Hs +Ms)). This provides the following set of equations.
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Fig. 2. Fast convergence of solutions of equations (3.1), (3.2), (3.5), (3.6), (3.7), (3.10), (3.11), (3.12),
(3.15), (3.16), (3.17), (3.18). The parameter values are th = 1, νh = 1, α = 0.5, νff = 1, νgf = 0.8. All
individuals start originally as searchers with Ds = Rs = Ms = Hs = 10. Black lines are for ta = 0.3,
gray line for ta = 1, light gray line for ta = 2.
d
dt
Ds = t−1h Dh + νh(Hs +Ms)Dh − νffDs (3.1)
d
dt
Dh =−t−1h Dh − νh(Hs +Ms)Dh + νffDs (3.2)
Dd =Ds +Dh (3.3)
In the equilibrium, both sides of the equations (3.1) and (3.2) are equal 0 which together
with (3.3) provides
Dd
Dh
= 1 +
1
thνff
+
νh(Hs +Ms)
νff
(3.4)
3.2. Retaliators
Retaliators can go through searching, handling and resisting stages. If a Retaliator is
searching, it can become a handler if it finds food (with rate νff). If the Retaliator is
handling, it can become
– a searcher if it finishes handling (with rate t−1h )
– a resister if it is found by a searching Hawk or Marauder (with rate νh(Hs +Ms)).
If the Retaliator is resisting, it can become
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– a handler if it wins the fight (with rate (1− α)( ta2 )−1),
– a searcher if it loses the fight (with rate α( ta2 )
−1).
This provides the following set of equations (already assumed to be in the equilibrium
conditions).
0 =
d
dt
Rs = −νffRs + t−1h Rh + 2αt−1a Rr (3.5)
0 =
d
dt
Rh = −t−1h Rh − νh(Hs +Ms)Rh + νffRs
+2(1− α)t−1a Rr (3.6)
0 =
d
dt
Rr = −2t−1a Rr + νh(Hs +Ms)Rh (3.7)
Rd =Rs +Rh +Rr (3.8)
By (3.8), (3.5) and (3.7),
Rd
Rh
= 1 +
1
νff
· (t−1h + ανh(Hs +Ms))+ νh(Hs +Ms) ta2 (3.9)
3.3. Marauders
Marauders can go through searching, handling and attacking stages. If a Marauder is
searching, it can become
– a handler if it finds food (with the rate νgf) or a handling Dove or Marauder (with
the rate νh(Dh +Mh)),
– an attacker if it finds a handling Hawk or Retaliator (with the rate νh(Hh +Rh)).
If the Marauder is handling, it can become
– a searcher if it finishes handling (with rate t−1h ) or is found by a searching Hawk or
Marauder (with rate νh(Hs +Ms)),
If the Marauder is attacking, it can become
– a handler if it wins the fight (with rate α( ta2 )
−1),
– a searcher if it loses the fight (with rate (1− α)( ta2 )−1).
This provides the following set of equations.
0 =
d
dt
Ms = −νhPhMs − νgfMs +
(
t−1h + νh(Hs +Ms)
)
Mh
+2(1− α)t−1a Ma (3.10)
0 =
d
dt
Mh = −(t−1h + νh(Hs +Ms))Mh + (νgf + νh(Dh +Mh))Ms
+2αt−1a Ma (3.11)
0 =
d
dt
Ma = −2t−1a Ma + νh(Hh +Rh)Ms (3.12)
Md =Ms +Mh +Ma (3.13)
By (3.12),
Ma
Mh
=
Ma
Ms
· Ms
Mh
= νh(Hh +Rh)
ta
2
· Ms
Mh
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and by (3.10)
Ms
Mh
=
t−1h + νh(Hs +Ms)
νhPh + νgf − (1− α)νh(Hh +Rh) .
Thus,
Md
Mh
= 1 +
t−1h + νh(Hs +Ms)
νhPh + νgf − (1− α)νh(Hh +Rh) ·
(
1 + νh(Hh +Rh)
ta
2
)
. (3.14)
3.4. Hawks
Hawks can go through four different stages - searching, handling, attacking, and re-
sisting. If a Hawk is searching, it can become
– a handler if it finds food (with rate νgf) or a handling Dove or Marauder (with rate
νh(Dh +Mh)),
– an attacker if it finds a handling Hawk or Retaliator (with rate νh(Hh +Rh)).
If the Hawk is handling, it can become
– a searcher if it finishes handling (with rate t−1h ),
– a resister if it is found by a searching Hawk or Marauder (with rate νh(Hs +Ms)).
If the Hawk is attacking, it can become
– a handler if it wins the fight (with rate α( ta2 )
−1),
– a searcher if it loses the fight (with rate (1− α)( ta2 )−1).
If the Hawk is resisting, it can become
– a searcher if it loses the fight (with rate α( ta2 )
−1),
– a handler if it wins the fight (with rate (1− α)( ta2 )−1).
It gives the following set of equations.
0 =
d
dt
Hs = −νhPhHs − νgfHs + t−1h Hh + 2(1− α)t−1a Ha
+2αt−1a Hr (3.15)
0 =
d
dt
Hh = −νh(Hs +Ms)Hh − t−1h Hh + (νgf + νh(Mh +Dh))Hs
+2αt−1a Ha + 2(1− α)t−1a Hr (3.16)
0 =
d
dt
Ha = −2t−1a Ha + νh(Hh +Rh)Hs (3.17)
0 =
d
dt
Hr = −2t−1a Hr + νh(Hs +Ms)Hh (3.18)
Hd =Hs +Hh +Ha +Hr (3.19)
By (3.18)
Hr
Hh
= νh(Hs +Ms)
ta
2
;
by (3.17)
Ha
Hh
=
Ha
Hs
· Hs
Hh
= νh(Hh +Rh)
ta
2
· Hs
Hh
,
and by (3.16)
Hs
Hh
=
t−1h + ανhMs
νgf + νh(Dh +Mh) + ανhRh
. (3.20)
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Thus, by (3.19),
Hd
Hh
= 1 +
t−1h + ανhMs
νgf + νh(Dh +Mh) + ανhRh
·
(
1 + νh(Hh +Rh)
ta
2
)
+νh(Hs +Ms)
ta
2
(3.21)
Note that by using equation (3.15) rather than (3.16) in the above process we get the
following expression equivalent to (3.21)
Hd
Hh
= 1 +
t−1h + ανh(Hs +Ms)
νgf + νh(Dh +Mh) + ανh(Hh +Rh)
·
(
1 + νh(Hh +Rh)
ta
2
)
+νh(Hs +Ms)
ta
2
(3.22)
4. General comparisons
We can use the inverse handling ratios from the previous sections to establish some
conditions when a given strategy has (or has not) an advantage against another strategy
in a general population mixture. Since all stable population mixtures require the total
consumption times of all strategies involved in the mixture to be identical, this in turn
will show when the mixture can be invaded by the strategy in question. We consider pairs
of strategies in turn, comparing the inverse handling ratio from the previous section. In
each case we give the condition for the first strategy to be better than the second one
(the condition for the second strategy to be better is just the reverse of this condition).
By (3.4) and (3.9), Dove beats Retaliator if
1− α < ta
2
νff (4.1)
(unless Hs +Ms = 0 when both always do equally well).
By (3.4) and (3.14), Dove beats Marauder if
νff − νgf
νh
> Dh +Mh + (Hh +Rh) ·
(
α− νff ta2
)
. (4.2)
By (3.14) and (3.22), Marauder beats Hawk if
ta
2
νgf − (1− α) + νh ta2
(
Dh +Mh + (Hh +Rh)(2α− 1)
)
> 0 (4.3)
(unless Hs +Ms = 0 when both always do equally well).
Using (3.9) and (3.21), Retaliator beats Hawk under exactly the same conditions as
Dove beats Marauder and in any population mixture Hawks have higher payoffs than
Retaliators if and only if Marauders have a higher payoff than Doves. Expressed in
formulae this is
Hh
Hd
>
Rh
Rd
⇔ Mh
Md
>
Dh
Dd
For Hawk to be an ESS it must have a higher payoff than Retaliator, Dove or Marauder
i.e.
Hh
Hd
> max
(
Rh
Rd
,
Dh
Dd
,
Mh
Md
)
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Clearly this requires
Hh
Hd
>
Rh
Rd
which in turn implies
Mh
Md
>
Dh
Dd
i.e.
Hh
Hd
> max
(
Rh
Rd
,
Dh
Dd
,
Mh
Md
)
⇔ Hh
Hd
> max
(
Rh
Rd
,
Mh
Md
)
Hawk is thus an ESS if and only if it cannot be invaded by Marauder or Retaliator,
and consideration of invasion by Dove is superfluous. Similarly whenever Dove can be
invaded by Hawk it can be invaded by one of the others. The same argument works
for Marauder and Retaliator, so that whenever Retaliator is invaded by Marauder, or
Marauder is invaded by Retaliator, the strategy will also be invaded by either Hawk or
Dove. It is thus never necessary to consider invasion by the ”opposite strategy” (where
both attacking and resisting behavior differ).
5. Evolutionarily stable mixtures
We shall now consider the various possible population mixtures in turn. There are 15
possibilities to consider (each of Hawk, Marauder, Retaliator and Dove can either be
included in the population or not, excluding the case where none are present).
Some of these results can be obtained by revisiting the paper Luther et al (2007). That
paper considered two populations of individuals from the same species, one of which was
a pure forager, and the other foraged but also indulged in kleptoparasitism (at some
cost to its foraging ability). The potential kleptoparasite could attack or not (although it
could not tell which type its potential victim was) and either type could choose to resist
any attack or not. Under certain circumstances evolution eliminated one of the groups
to leave a single population, in others a mixture of the two groups survived.
This actually incorporates our situation whenever there are exactly two different strate-
gies in a mixture one of which is a kleptoparasite (Marauder or Hawk) and one of which
is not (Dove or Retaliator), or if there is just a single strategy. Thus from the paper we
can directly obtain some of the following results (for νf > νg).
5.1. Pure ESS’s
In this section we will ask when a population consisting of a single strategy can or
cannot be invaded.
5.1.1. Dove as an ESS
Strictly speaking, Dove is never an ESS, because it can always be invaded by Retaliator
(by drift).
Once we allow a constant presence of a small amount of Hawks and/or Marauders, we
get that Retaliator cannot invade Dove as long as (4.1) holds:
1− α < ta
2
νff
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(i.e. if there is enough food or fights are too long).
By (4.2), Dove can not be invaded by Marauder if
Dh <
νff − νgf
νh
.
Since, by (3.4), for Dd ≈ P ,
Dh =
thνff
thνff + 1
P,
we get that Dove is an ESS if
1− α < ta
2
νff and P <
νff − νgf
νh
· thνff + 1
thνff
. (5.1)
In particular, pure Dove can be an ESS only if νgf < νff , i.e. Doves find food faster than
Hawks or Marauders. And even then, only if νhP · thνffthνff+1 is smaller than νff − νgf , i.e.
the rate that Hawks and/or Marauders find handling Doves is smaller than the Dove’s
advantage in finding food. Another interpretation is that this only occurs in sufficiently
low density populations (such populations do not give kleptoparasitic invaders a chance
of finding a handler very fast).
5.1.2. Retaliator as an ESS
Similarly to the Dove situation, pure Retaliator can never be an ESS because it can
always be invaded by Doves by drift. Nevertheless, when we allow a small presence of
Hawks and/or Marauders, we get (as above) that Retaliator cannot be invaded by Doves
if and only if the condition (4.1) does not hold, i.e.
νff
ta
2
< 1− α.
When Rd ≈ P we get from (3.14) and (3.21) that MdMh = HdHh . As discussed in section
4, Retaliator beats Hawk if and only if Dove beats Marauder. Thus, by (4.2), one needs
Rh
(
α− ta
2
νff
)
<
νff − νgf
νh
.
Since Rh =
thνff
thνff+1
P , Retaliator is an ESS if
νff
ta
2
< 1− α, νff ta2 < α, P <
νff − νgf
νh
· 1
α− νff ta2
· thνff + 1
thνff
(5.2)
or
νff
ta
2
< 1− α, νff ta2 > α, P >
νgf − νff
νh
· 1
νff
ta
2 − α
· thνff + 1
thνff
(5.3)
The first condition says that if fights are short or there is not enough food, then
Retaliator is an ESS in a low density population only (short fights are good for Marauders
or Hawks; not enough food increases the searching time, i.e. it, relatively, decreases the
fight time.) Moreover, Retaliator is an ESS only if νff > νgf , i.e. if kleptoparasitic birds
have a disadvantage.
The second condition is possible only for α < 0.5, i.e. when resisters have an advantage
against their attackers. Retaliator is then an ESS in sufficiently high density populations
and when the fights do not take too much time. Long fights would mean that Doves do
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better. A high density population is needed because kleptoparasites are forced to engage
in fights and thus lose time while the substantial remainder of the Retaliator population
can harvest the food undisturbed. In this sense, the denser the population, the better for
the Retaliators.
5.1.3. Marauder as an ESS
In the population of Marauders only (Md = P ), there are no fights, so Ma = 0 and
consequently the equation (3.10) reduces to
0 =
d
dt
Ms = −νgfMs + t−1h Mh.
Thus,
Ms
Mh
=
1
thνgf
,
Md
Mh
= 1 +
1
thνgf
and
Mh = P · thνgf1 + thνgf , Ms = P ·
1
1 + thνgf
.
By (4.2), Marauder cannot be invaded by Doves if
Mh >
νff − νgf
νh
,
i.e. if
P >
νff − νgf
νh
· 1 + thνgf
thνgf
. (5.4)
Marauders cannot be invaded by Hawks if, by (4.3),
νh
ta
2
Mh > 1− α− ta2 νgf,
i.e. if
P >
2
taνh
(
1− α− ta
2
νgf
)
· thνgf + 1
thνgf
(5.5)
We do not need to consider the invasion by Retaliators since if Marauder is invaded
by Retaliator it will also be invaded either by Dove or Hawk as discussed in Section 4.
Conditions (5.4) and (5.5) together give
P >
(
max
{
2(1− α)
ta
, νff
}
− νgf
)
· thνgf + 1
νhthνgf
(5.6)
Thus, pure Marauder is an ESS if either
νff
ta
2
> 1− α, and P > νff − νgf
νh
· 1 + thνgf
thνgf
(5.7)
or
νff
ta
2
< 1− α, and P > 2
taνh
(
1− α− ta
2
νgf
)
· thνgf + 1
thνgf
. (5.8)
The distinction between the two conditions lies in the relationship between νff ta2 and
1 − α. If νff ta2 > 1 − α, it means a) fights are long and b) it is not beneficial to resist.
Thus, Marauders cannot be invaded by Hawks nor by Retaliators. Marauders cannot be
invaded by Doves if the population is dense enough (no matter how big the disadvantage
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of kleptoparasites) because in the population where everybody steals, Doves lose their
food very fast but do not acquire it back by stealing, as Marauders do.
If νff ta2 < 1− α, resisting the attack is beneficial. Yet, when the population is dense
enough, then Hawks cannot invade Marauder (they would be ”doomed” to resist too
much) and Retaliators cannot invade Marauders for the same reason.
5.1.4. Hawk as an ESS
When Hawk is the only type in the population, by (3.17) and (3.18),
Ha = νh
ta
2
HsHh = Hr
and, by (3.16), Hh = νgfthHs. By (3.19), we can evaluate Hh in the population of Hawks
only. As done already in Ruxton and Moody (1997), Hh = Phr, where hr, the handling
ratio, is the positive root of the quadratic equation
h2rtaνhP + hr(1 + νgfth)− νgfth = 0. (5.9)
This yields
Hh = hrP =
1 + νgfth
2taνh
·
(
−1 +
√
1 +
4taνhthPνgf
(1 + νgfth)2
)
, (5.10)
which can be later used for determining conditions on P from conditions on Hh.
Retaliator cannot invade Hawk only if Dove cannot invade Marauder, i.e., by (4.2) if
νff − νgf
νh
< Hh
(
α− νff ta2
)
,
i.e. if
ta
2
νff < α and Phr >
νff − νgf
νh
· 1
α− ta2 νff
,
or
ta
2
νff > α and Phr <
νgf − νff
νh
· 1ta
2 νff − α
.
By (4.3), Hawk cannot be invaded by Marauder if
ta
2
νgf − (1− α) < Hhνh ta2 (1− 2α),
i.e. if
2α < 1 and Phr >
νgf − 2(1− α)/ta
νh
· 1
1− 2α,
or
2α > 1 and Phr <
νgf − 2(1− α)/ta
νh
· 1
1− 2α.
By results of Section 4, if Doves invade Hawks then either Marauders or Retaliators
invade Hawks so the above are the only conditions we need.
13
5.2. Mixed ESS’s
We reiterate that in the current work a mixed ESS (or a mixture) refers to a population
of different individuals who each play a unique pure strategy, and not to individuals who
are capable of playing more than one strategy.
5.2.1. Marauders and Doves
A mixture of Marauders and Doves occurs if Doves can invade Marauders, Marauders
can invade Doves and neither Hawks or Retaliators can invade. From the general invasion
conditions, since Doves and Marauders do equally well, Retaliators and Hawks do equally
well and so it is enough to consider the invasion of Doves by Retaliators only. This is
equivalent to finding when it is optimal to not resist attacks in such a mixture. The
inequalities (4.1) and (4.2) (the second one must hold for Md ≈ P and must not hold for
Dd ≈ P ) yield the conditions
νff
ta
2
> 1− α, (νff − νgf)(νffth + 1)
νffthνh
< P <
(νff − νgf)(νgfth + 1)
νgfthνh
(5.11)
Notice that this is possible only if νff > νgf , i.e. if kleptoparasites have a disadvantage.
A mixture of Dove and Marauder is thus only possible if kleptoparasites forage less effi-
ciently than non-kleptoparasites, fights are sufficiently long, and the population density
is at an intermediate level.
The conditions above are both sufficient and necessary for a stable mixture to occur.
Indeed, when there is an equilibrium between Marauders and Doves, the condition (4.2)
provides
Dh +Mh =
νff − νgf
νh
and it follows that νff > νgf . Adding equations (3.1) and (3.10) and adding Ds +Ms
to the result yields after rearranging
thνgf
1 + thνgf
P < Dh +Mh < P
thνff
1 + thνff
, (5.12)
which is exactly the condition we introduced above. Notice that the left hand side of the
inequality (5.12) is Ph in a pure Marauder population, while the right hand side of (5.12)
is Ph in a pure Dove population.
5.2.2. Hawks and Retaliators
A mixture of Hawk and Retaliator occurs if Retaliator can invade Hawk, Hawk can
invade Retaliator and in such a mixture it is optimal to resist attacks, which prevents
the invasion of Doves or Marauders. As in Section 4, invasion of Dove or Marauder does
not occur if and only if Dove does not invade Retaliator, i.e. if, by (4.1), 1− α > νff ta2 .
Since Retaliator invades Hawk (and vice versa) if and only if Dove invades Marauder
(and vice versa), the condition (4.2) yields
P
νffth
1 + νffth
·
(
α− νff ta2
)
>
νff − νgf
νh
> Phr
(
α− νff ta2
)
.
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Since Rh = P · thνff1+thνff in a Retaliator only population, Hh = Phr in a Hawk only
population and hr <
νffth
1+νffth
, the above inequalities are possible only for α > νff ta2 and
νf > νg, which yields the conditions
νffta < 2(1− α),
1 + νffth
νffth
1(
α− νff ta2
) νff − νgf
νh
<P <
1
hr
1(
α− νff ta2
) νff − νgf
νh
A mixture of Hawk and Retaliator is thus only possible if kleptoparasites forage less
efficiently than non-kleptoparasites, fights are not too long, and the population density is
at an intermediate level. Note the similarity to the conditions for the Dove and Marauder
mixture, the major difference being that for the Hawk-Retaliator mixture, fights must
be short.
5.2.3. Mixtures involving Dove and Retaliator
In this section we consider all of the possible mixtures which include the strategies
Dove and Retaliator, possibly with other strategies as well. These mixtures are
1) Dove and Retaliator,
2) Marauder, Dove and Retaliator,
3) Hawk, Dove and Retaliator,
4) Marauder, Hawk, Dove and Retaliator.
By (4.1), Doves and Retaliators have the same payoff only if a) νff ta2 = 1 − α, or
b) there are no Hawks or Marauders in the population. The condition νff ta2 = 1 − α
occurs only at a precise coincidence of ecological parameters, which has zero probability
for any real situation, and so is a degenerate case. Thus, there are no mixed equilibria in
mixtures 2), 3) and 4).
If there are no Hawks or Marauders in the population, Doves and Retaliators have equal
payoffs here irrespective of the proportion of Doves, and so the population is subject to
genetic drift, and there is not a unique equilibrium. Note that if we allowed the repeated
attempted invasion by mutants of other strategies, then either Dove or Retaliator would
have a fitness advantage and so a pure solution would result (this is discussed in the
sections for pure Dove and pure Retaliator).
5.2.4. Hawks and Doves
A mixture of Hawk and Dove individuals only is not possible (because of invasion by
one or other of Marauder and Retaliator). This is an extension of the result from Luther
et al (2007). This result follows directly from the comparison conditions in Section 4.
Indeed, if Marauder does not do better than Dove, then Hawk does no better than
Retaliator. So the only possibility to have a Dove and Hawk mixture is when all types
do equally well (and this situation is not possible as discussed in 5.2.3).
5.2.5. Marauders and Retaliators
Similarly to the Hawk - Dove mixture, a mixture of Marauder and Retaliator indi-
viduals only is not possible, due to invasion by either Dove or Hawk. This result again
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follows from the general comparisons from Section 4 in the same manner and is again an
extension of one from Luther et al (2007).
5.2.6. Mixtures involving Hawk and Marauder
The remaining three mixtures are
1) Marauder and Hawk,
2) Marauder, Hawk and Dove,
3) Marauder, Hawk and Retaliator,
which all include Marauder and Hawk.
If three strategies have the same payoff, the fourth one needs to have the same payoff
as follows from the general invasion conditions in Section 4. This means that neither
a mixture of Hawks, Marauders and Doves, nor a mixture of Hawks, Marauders and
Retaliators can be an ESS.
Finally we must consider Hawk and Marauder only.
Combining several earlier equations ((3.10)-(3.11)+(3.15)-(3.16)) gives
thνgfPs = Ph (5.13)
Equation (3.18), combined with the facts that Pa = Pr, and Hr = Pr gives
Pa + Pr = taνhHhPs
Thus we can express P = Pa + Pr + Ps + Ph in terms of Ph and Hh giving
P
Ph
=
thνgf + 1 + taνhHh
thνgf
(5.14)
We show that there is no stable mixture. To have such a mixture, we need Hh/Hd =
Mh/Md, which is, by (4.3), equivalent to
(1− α)− ta
2
νgf − νh ta2 (Ph − 2Hh(1− α)) = 0 (5.15)
The left hand side of (5.15) reaches its minimum value in an all Marauder population
since Ph attains the maximum when there are no fights, and Hh is equal to 0. Thus if
there are any roots to (5.15), pure Marauder must also be an ESS. This in turn means
that as we decrease the proportion of Marauders, Md, from P , the first root of (5.15) we
reach (i.e. the largest root of (5.15)) is unstable. Thus, if there is a stable root of (5.15),
there must be at least two roots. By (5.14), increasing Ph corresponds to decreasing
Hh. Hence, there can only be at most one value of Ph which satisfies (5.14) and (5.15).
Thus, for there to be a stable root of (5.15), there must be (at least) two population
mixtures which yield the same Ph. By (5.14), Hh is the same in both mixtures as well.
This determinesMh and Ps, sinceMh = Ph−Hh and, by (5.13), Ps = Ph/(thνgf). From
(3.20) we have
Hs
Hh
=
t−1h + ανhMs
νgf + νhMh
.
For two different population mixtures with the same Hh and Ph to satisfy the above,
both Hs and Ms are must be larger in one of the populations than the other, which
contradicts the statement that Ps is constant. Thus no such mixtures are possible, and
there is not a stable Hawk-Marauder mixture.
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Dove in any pattern for relatively small P
and for νff > max{νgf, 2(1−α)ta }
Retaliator only if
2(1−α)
ta
> min{νgf, 2αta }
νff should be below
2(1−α)
ta
Marauder in any pattern, usually for high P
Hawk in all patterns except for
2(1−α)
ta
< νgf <
2α
ta
;
νff should be no more than
2(1−α)
ta
mixture of
Marauders and Doves
in any pattern for relatively medium P
and for νff > max{νgf, 2(1−α)ta }
mixture of
Hawks and Retaliators
only if νgf < min{ 2(1−α)ta ,
2α
ta
}
and for νff between them
Table 2
Possible ESS and their occurrence.
6. Patterns of ESSs
In this section we consider the various combinations of ESS types that can occur for the
same parameters. This is important, as if there is more than a single ESS at a particular
combination of parameters, then identical populations in different locations can display
completely different behavior due to historical conditions or chance, rather than any
differences in inherent characteristics. We use the term Patterns of ESSs for this idea,
after the work of Cannings and Vickers (1988); Vickers and Cannings (1988) (see also for
example Broom, Cannings and Vickers, 1994). The Pattern of a game is the collection of
supports (the set of pure strategies which occur with non-zero probability) of the ESSs
of the game. For example the pattern (M,HR) in our game refers to the case where
there is a pure Marauder ESS as well as a mixture of Hawk and Retaliator for the same
parameter values (and so the same game), and no other ESSs. Note that in the study of
patterns of ESSs, only the strategies involved in an ESS, rather than their frequencies,
are considered.
There are six possible ESS’s, four of them are the strategies Dove, Retaliator, Marauder
and Hawk, two of them are mixtures of strategies: a mixture of Marauders and Doves
and a mixture of Hawks and Retaliators. No matter what the parameters, there is always
at least one ESS.
Table 2 shows for what parameter values the ESSs occur.
For the six ESSs, each can occur as the unique ESS, but it is also possible to have two
or three ESSs for particular sets of parameter values (there cannot be four). The possible
combinations of two ESSs are Hawk or Marauder, Retaliator or Marauder, and Marauder
or a mixture of Hawks and Retaliators. The possible combinations of three ESSs are
Hawk or Marauder or Retaliator. In total, there are ten distinct ESS combinations over
the range of all parameters (six unique ESSs and four cases of multiple ESSs).
There are essentially six parameters of our model. The population density, P , the speed
kleptoparasites and non-kleptoparasites search for food, νgf and νff , the duration of
fights, ta2 , attacker’s chances of winning the contest, α, and the time needed for handling
the food, th. We will fix (arbitrarily) all parameters but νff and P and will investigate
how the ESS outcome changes depending on them.
There are three natural breakpoints for νff :
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Hawk or Marauder in all orderings but
2(1−α)
ta
< νgf <
2α
ta
Retaliator or Marauder in all orderings but
2(1−α)
ta
< min{νgf, 2αta }
Hawk or Retaliator only if 2α
ta
< νgf <
2(1−α)
ta
Marauder or a mixture of
Hawks and Retaliators
only if νgf < min{ 2(1−α)ta ,
2α
ta
}
Marauder or Hawk
or Retaliators
only if 2α
ta
< min{νgf, 2(1−α)ta }
Table 3
Multiple ESSs and their occurrence in relation to the six size orderings of νgf,
2α
ta
and
2(1−α)
ta
(i) 2(1−α)ta ,
(ii) 2αta , and
(iii) νgf
There are six possible size orderings of these breakpoints (excluding equalities), and
the pattern of ESSs that we get depends to a certain extent on which ordering occurs, but
the essential structure does not differ unless the ordering does. Table 3 shows for which of
these size orderings the multiple ESSs occur. There is a total of eleven different patterns
of ESSs. Figure 3 shows nine of these patterns for the ordering νgf < 2αta <
2(1−α)
ta
.
An alternative structure which again has nine patterns, including the two patterns of
multiple ESSs Hawk or Retaliator, or Hawk or Retaliator or Marauder, not in Figure 3,
is shown in Figure 4 for the ordering 2αta < νgf <
2(1−α)
ta
.
The most interesting ESS is pure Marauder. It can occur as a unique ESS for some
parameter values, or at the same time as any of pure Hawk, pure Retaliator, a mixture of
Hawk and Retaliator, or pure Hawk and pure Retaliator. It cannot occur together with
Dove or the Marauder-Dove mixture. The pure Marauder ESS occurs always for high
population densities. In the population of all Marauders, there are no fights and thus the
total time for consumption of a food item equals (νgf)−1 + th (which means the sum of
time needed to find a food item plus the time needed to handle the item), although in
reality, the food item is often acquired by stealing from a handler. When the density of
the population is high, Marauders are uninvadable because any intruder would either be
spending too much time fighting (if it would resist with non zero probability) or it would
be losing food items while handling but not acquiring the food by stealing efficiently
enough (if not stealing with probability one).
The Dove ESS occurs for any of the ordering of parameters above as long as νff is
large enough and P is not too large. Having high νff means that food is easy to find and
thus it is not beneficial to resist. In relatively small density populations the encounters
between individuals are not too frequent and therefore the opportunity to attack is not
worth the associated loss of foraging efficiency (νgf < νff), so that Marauders cannot
invade.
A mixture of Marauders and Doves also occurs as an ESS for all orderings, as long
as νff is large and the population is of intermediate density. This mixture occurs as a
transition between pure Dove and pure Marauder for large νff . The actual stable mixture
varies from almost all Dove near the lower boundary to the region, increasing to almost
all Marauder near the upper boundary.
Hawk is an ESS only for relatively small values of νff . Small νff means that food
is scarce and thus valuable. It is thus beneficial to fight for it and to resist if attacked.
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Fig. 3. Patterns of ESSs for the ordering νgf <
2α
ta
<
2(1−α)
ta
. Legend: H = Hawk, M = Marauder,
R = Retaliator, D = Dove, XY = mixed ESS of X and Y , X + Y = 2 ESSs of either X or Y ;
PM =
(
2(1−α)
ta
− νgf
)
· thνhνgf+1
thνhνgf
. For this particular picture: νgf = 0.3, α = 0.4, th = νh = ta = 1,
νff ranges from 0 to 1.5, P ranges from 0 to 9.
Hawk can be an ESS for low density populations as well as for high density ones. The
only ordering when Hawk is not an ESS is when 2(1−α)ta < νgf <
2α
ta
when Marauder is
the only ESS for small νff . This is natural since the conditions imply a) α > 1/2, i.e.
it is beneficial to attack since the chances of success are high and b) a food item is not
valuable, since νgf is relatively high and thus it is not beneficial to resist and lose time
by fighting.
Retaliator is an ESS for medium values of νff . The value νff should never exceed
2(1−α)
ta
which is the point where resisting stops being beneficial due to the high cost of
time spent fighting compared to the chances of winning the fight. On the other hand,
νff should be high enough in order to assure that food is not too scarce and thus it is
not beneficial to look for handlers.
The mixture of Hawks and Retaliators occurs in a region between pure Hawks and pure
Retaliator if νgf < min{ 2(1−α)ta , 2αta }. In this setting, when νff is small, it is beneficial
to fight for food and Hawk is an ESS. For larger νff it is not beneficial to fight and
Retaliator is an ESS. If νff takes a value somewhere in between, Hawk can invade
Retaliator and vice versa and the strategies coexist. For larger population densities, the
same pattern occurs, but Marauder is a second ESS alternative.
If 2αta < min{νgf,
2(1−α)
ta
}, then there can be three different ESS - Hawk or Marauder
or Retaliator for the same set of parameter values.
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Fig. 4. Patterns of ESSs for the ordering 2α
ta
< νgf <
2(1−α)
ta
. Legend: H = Hawk, M = Marauder,
R = Retaliator, D = Dove, XY = mixed ESS of X and Y , X + Y = 2 ESSs of either X or Y ;
PM =
(
2(1−α)
ta
− νgf
)
· thνhνgf+1
thνhνgf
. For this particular picture: α = 0.25, νgf = th = νh = ta = 1, νff
ranges from 0 to 2, P ranges from 0 to 2.
7. Discussion
In this paper we have developed the game-theoretic model of kleptoparasitism intro-
duced in Broom and Ruxton (1998). Individuals use one of the four different strategies
first described in Broom et al (2004), depending upon whether they will attack con-
specifics for food, and whether they are prepared to resist any such attack. We have
also maintained the simplification that all birds are equally able fighters (so that the
probability of the attacker winning is independent of the types attacking and resisting).
Our model allows for a difference in the foraging rates of attackers and non-attackers
(perhaps because non-attackers can concentrate on searching for food rather than food
and conspecifics).
The model, in common with that of Broom and Ruxton (1998) and most subsequent
models, assumes that contest times are exponentially distributed and not under the
control of the participants. Note that in Ruxton and Broom (1999), however, the length
of the contest was under the control of the individuals, who played a classical war of
attrition to decide the winner. From this model, an exponential contest length occurs
naturally from optimal play within the contest for food. The same result also occurs in
the important earlier foraging models of Hines (1976, 1977) where individuals foraged
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and also entered contests over food, since these papers again used the war of attrition as
the basis for contests, introducing it to a more complex foraging setting for the first time.
As in our model, the aim was to find an evolutionarily stable foraging strategy where an
individual’s fitness was given by its foraging rate. There were two key differences between
the Hines (1976, 1977) models and ours. Firstly there was effectively no handling time
for a food item, so an individual that was successful in a contest always consumed the
item, and did not have to face subsequent challenges. Secondly the proportion of food
items contested was independent of the strategies played by individuals; in our model the
chosen strategies directly affect the likelihood of any subsequent item being competed
for, and also which type of opponent would be faced. This effect is central to this and
earlier models, and is the cause of their complexity, with individual contests generally
being very simple. In contrast the individual contests of Hines (1976, 1977) were more
complex, and are the central feature of these papers.
We have found general expressions for the inverse handling ratio, and hence the uptake
rate and the fitness, of each strategy in a general population mixture of different strate-
gies, and then found conditions for which each of the strategies or mixtures of strategies
are ESSs. Whether a strategy is an ESS or not of course depends upon the values of
the population parameters (see Table 1). All four strategies can be ESSs and two of the
possible mixtures of strategies can also be an ESS. There are thus six ESSs in total, each
of which can be the unique ESS; indeed there is always at least one ESS. It is possible
that there are two ESSs, and one case of three ESSs (but never more than three). When
there are multiple ESSs, in all but one case one of these is the Marauder ESS, which
can occur in conjunction with Hawk, Retaliator, a mixed ESS containing both Hawk and
Retaliator, or with both pures Retaliator and Hawk. The multiple ESS case without Ma-
rauder includes pure Hawk and pure Retaliator. This gives eleven possible ESS patterns
in total, which are best summarised by Figures 3 and 4.
In Section 5 we describe the conditions when each ESS occurs in more detail. In
particular Hawk occurs when the food gathering ability of foragers that also attack, or
general food availability, is poor and the population density is not too large (recalling
that interactions happen more frequently the denser the population). Marauders generally
thrive when the population density is large and food availability is also large. Retaliators
do better when food levels are intermediate and the population density is not large, and
Doves do better when food is plentiful and the population density is not too large. All
of these results are intuitively reasonable.
In each of the situations where there is more than one ESS, which is more likely to
occur? The only case where two ESSs other than Marauder occurred simultaneously
was for Hawk and Retaliator (either as two pure ESSs or three pure ESSs including
Marauder), which was in the case when the Hawk’s foraging rate was greater than the
Retaliator’s. This case is perhaps unrealistic because a Hawk must split its attention
between searching for food and for kleptoparasitic opportunities, whereas a Retaliator
can dedicate itself to searching for food, and thus this combination is unlikely to occur.
The Marauder and Retaliator case is similar to the owner intruder game of Maynard
Smith and Parker (1976) where there is a symmetrical game (in the sense of payoffs for
escalating or not) but with the individuals in different roles. The Marauder ESS is in
some ways a paradoxical strategy, in a similar way to the anti-Bourgeois strategy X,
where the owner always gives way to the intruder. The authors argued that it would be
much less likely to occur in practice than Bourgeois, although they identified one case
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where it did occur. Thus perhaps when multiple ESSs are available, Marauder might not
be observed. If strategies which involve resistance are stable, then non-resistance may
never evolve. This would yield a natural single solution for realistic parameter values.
This does however suppose that the individuals would naturally resist, and only not resist
if this was subsequently beneficial. Even if this is true, and it might not be, if parameters
change through time, they may well move to a set of values where Marauder is the unique
ESS, and then move to one where two ESSs are possible, but the population starts in
the still stable Marauder strategy.
The situation is in fact rather different in the case of Marauder and Retaliator being
ESSs, to when Marauder and Hawk are ESSs. For the Hawk and Marauder case, Ma-
rauders do better in populations with higher food availability, Hawks do better when this
availability is lower. However when all individuals play Hawk time is wasted in fighting
and the consumption rate goes down, effectively mirroring lower food availability. There
are thus parameter values when Marauders do better in a population of Marauders and
Hawks do better in a population of Hawks.
In this paper we have considered the four most basic types of attitude to kleptoparasitic
opportunity and threat; namely the four combinations of attack or not attack, with resist
or not resist an attack. How do these strategies relate to the behavior of real birds? Most
birds effectively play either the Dove or Retaliator strategy, and exist in a population
where no food stealing takes place. If a population has the strategy Hawk there will be
widespread kleptoparasitism with visible contests, and it is this strategy which yields the
most obvious kleptoparasitic behavior. Our theoretical model makes predictions about
when each of the basic types of behavior or mixtures of these basic types should occur,
and we hope that the model will be compared to real populations to test the accuracy
of its predictions.
These four different tactics all seem plausible in terms of underlying biology. A real
population that played Marauder would be characterised by frequent very short contests.
Behavior of this type occurs for various wading birds (see e.g. Stillman et al, 1997); of-
ten only some birds will attack, and so this example is more characteristic of our mixed
populations in such cases (note that this could also be linked to dominance relation-
ships between the birds). The Marauder tactic may also equate to the concept of stealth
kelptoparasitism introduced by Giraldeau and Caraco (2000). Here kleptoaparasitic acts
are not immediately detected by the victim, or the victim is not in a position to react
immediately, or feature great speed by the thief. Giraldeau and Caraco discuss obser-
vations of kelp gulls (Larus domenicanus) stealing from each other reported by Hockey
et al. (1989) as an example of stealth kleptoparasitism. The gulls are feeding on bivalue
shellfish. They sometimes break the protective shell of their prey by dropping the bivalve
from a great height onto rocks. This may give other gulls standing on the rocks the op-
portunity to rush in and steal the newly-exposed prey before the focal gull can swoop
down from high above. In such cases, the victim does not seem generally to pursue the
thief, perhaps because it would take a long time to close the height differential between
them, during which time the thief will have made good their escape or even consumed
the prey. Individuals play both roles, sometimes being aggressive thieves and sometimes
passive victims, exactly as in the Marauder strategy. A further example of such stealth
kleptoparasitism occurs in some species of birds and mammals that horde food. If one
individual discovers the unguarded cache of another then it may invest significant energy
in exposing and exploiting that cache, but when the victim returns they may not invest
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in pursuit of the thief, who may by then be a long time gone and consequently hard
to find, Giraldeau and Carcaco discuss several studies that observe this behavior. The
other three tactics can be seen to more easily reflect conventional aggressive contests.
Again in gulls, Hesp & Barnard (1989) discuss differences between immature and mature
black-headed gulls, Larus ridindus. Younger gulls tended both to avoid attacking and to
show little resistance to attack (like the Dove strategy), whereas adults showed strong
aggressiveness when in either position (like the Hawk strategy). Interestingly, aggressive-
ness seemed to develop first in terms of resistance to attack rather than in self-induced
attacks, thus leading to individuals progressing through their lives from the Dove strat-
egy, through Retaliator to the Hawk strategy. Further, generally aggressiveness can be
related to high-value hard-to-find items (Morand-Ferron et al. 2007) and so asymmetry
between individuals in their ability to find prey or their current need to eat can lead to
asymmetry in their evaluation of the value of the contested prey item, leading to differ-
ential investment and so Marauder or Retaliator strategies. Such asymmetry may also be
introduced by the spatial interaction of the two participants. It may simply be that if the
thief can swoop on their victim in flight from above and use gravity to accelerate away,
then pursuit is futile and we see a Marauder-like situations, whereas the same victim
may defend their prize much more vigorously against the same thief if both meet on the
ground (leading to a Hawk-type tactic involving the same participants).
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